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THE CHINESE MEDIA SCENE: 
A POLITICO-STRATEGIC TAKE ON THE STATE OF PLAY 
 
Introduction 
The following account of the changing media 
scene in China, and its impact on the polity, is based on a 
survey of openly available literature on the subject (in 
particular, the excellent collection of overview articles by 
Western and Chinese scholars in the book “Changing 
Media, Changing China”, Ed..Susan L. Shirk, OUP, 
2011) and a monitoring of (English language versions of) 
Chinese media websites and some official Chinese 
documents available on the I-net. It is a subjective 
assessment of the state of play. As such, responsibility for 
the overall picture (and judgements made or borrowed) 
rests squarely with the author, even though no originality 
can be claimed for the inputs – insights from the works of 
several others – utilised herein. These remarks were 
prepared, in the main, for the NIAS seminar on “Rising 
China” in December 2011. 
2.      There has been a sea-change in the Chinese media 
scene in recent decades. As in other fields, the altered 
scenario is the result of re-orientation of the focus of all 
work of the Party (and State), away from the “politics in 
command” dictum (to correct for "left deviation" errors 
made during the “lost decade”, 1966-76, of the Cultural 




opening up to the outside world that was decided upon at 
the landmark (December 1978) 3rd Plenum of the 11
th
 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP CC) under the influence of Deng Xiaoping. It 
might be useful to take a look at this changing, and 
changed, landscape around the following schema, before 
concluding with an overall assessment of the state of 
play in the media-polity dialectic: 
I. Scenario at the Ground level:  
a) Press 
b) TV 
c) I-net and social media 
II. Censorship Scene 
III. Impact of New Information Environment 
IV. Official Approach in the Changing Scenario 
I. Scenario at the Ground level:  
3. The key elements could be described as follows: 
a) Press 
 There has been phenomenal growth over the last three 
decades – from 69 in 1979, the number of newspapers 




with circulation of a million plus. The number of 
magazines has likewise soared to over 9000.  
 
 The growth has not been quantitative only -- a 
commercial media and lighter social (entertainment) 
media has emerged as a result of the post-'78 change in 
policies and processes. The latter have resulted in 
relaxation of controls to permit: 
-  freer expression (hence the more lively   style of 
newspapers and journals now as compared to 
earlier),  
 -  raising of revenues through advertising   
(alongside withdrawal of budgetary support from 
Government), resulting in the press being 
constrained to cater to audience tastes in news 
content and style, 
 -  retention of profits (resulting in rises in  
circulation across the board, despite cessation of 
mandatory subscriptions by Govt. Departments 
since 2003). 
 The PLA daily is, however, an exception to the 
above-mentioned trends:  
It has been protected from this transformation 
affecting the civilian media and remains fundament-
ally unchanged, operating on the old “propaganda 
first, profitability second” maxim and presenting the 




in the soldiery. It has its captive readership of 2.5 
million intact, having successfully bucked the trend 
of stopping mandatory subscriptions by all depart-
mental units.  
This has to be understood (together with the steady 
increases in PLA budget allocations over the last 15 
years) as the CCP’s compulsion to keep this ultimate 
guarantor of power to rule satisfied and loyal. 
b) TV 
By far more influential than the press (being the sole 
source of news and entertainment for the 60% 
population in the rural areas), TV is, not surprisingly, 
more tightly controlled. There is no competition, as in 
case of the press, with only the staid State owned 
channels operational.  
Yet TV producers too have to pay attention to ratings 
and audience preferences if they are to earn 
advertising revenue. TV in China has been described 
by one Chinese journalist (Miao Di) as a double 
gendered rooster – “Propaganda Departments like it 
to crow, while Finance Departments want it to lay 
eggs”! 
A balance of sorts is sought to be struck by the TV 
channels -- by producing politically innocuous and 
leisure (entertainment) programs, not hard news or 




c)  I-net :   
Here there has been a dramatic expansion since  
embrace of the I-net by the CCP/State in 1992/93, 
with about 500 million users today (as many as half 
of them estimated to be intensive ones, i.e. tweeters 
and/or bloggers). 
What the people think of the leadership and the 
Government (but does not find expression in the 
press and on TV) is increasingly being reflected in 
the ‘microblogosphere', obliging authority to be 
sensitive to its 'digital image' (or the image of the 
'digital twin' of the Party State, as it has been termed) 
in the virtual world and to pay attention to what is 
being discussed there and interact with the netizenry.  
    [Some smart senior (provincial) Party functionaries 
have opened their own micro-blogs (in their real 
names) to reach out to their citizens. Many officials 
and offices have tweeting accounts, which they use to 
communicate directly with their constituents. Also 
there is acknowledgement, publicly, of the increasing 
(ideological) influence of blogs, including those of 
foreign Governments – of Embassies in China (posted 
on Chinese sites) engaging in “public diplomacy” -- on 
opinion leaders amongst Chinese netizens.] 
Public opinion communicated through on-line forums 
and weblogs, reinforcing the more liberal elements in 
the press, is increasingly setting the governance 




Not surprisingly, it is the social media that is regarded 
as the most potent threat out of all the media forms.  
4. Overall, the most notable feature of the Chinese media 
scene today is a new information environment marked 
by the emergence of a hugely expanded, and 
financially independent, press (including a market 
driven segment in metro areas) and an alert, and 
growing, on-line public opinion that cannot be wished 
away by officialdom, try as it may. 
5. This change has come about despite little change in 
the ownership structure of the press and TV (which have 
been kept, almost all, in the hands of media groups led 
by Party or Govt. newspapers with the help of a 
restrictive licensing policy), and therefore obviously 
cannot be said to be an unqualified one. It is subject to 
several caveats and conditions, and nuances, but the 
main trend is clearly as above.  
II. Censorship Scene 
6. So what does this mean in terms of censorship by 
officialdom ? Has the old ham-handed approach of the 
pre-reform period, when the media was treated as a 
department under the direct control of the Propaganda 
Wing of the CCP and Information Departments of the 
State, been given up? No, not at all, but today the 
preferred methods are indirect (and considerably more 
sophisticated) ones, mindful of the adverse publicity 




7.  Political compliance in case of the press and TV is 
ensured through trusted groups of professionals and 
others closely connected to the CCP power centers, who 
are given charge of oversight (such that they need no 
more than informal guidance) – the managing group of 
editors groomed within Party circles. In case of the I-net, 
control is exercised through the licensees of the news 
web-sites. (Even if they be non-Party individuals, they 
are made to fall in line probably by leveraging on the 
largesse of Government grant of privileged – sometimes 
monopoly -- status to them. Choice of the operators in 
the private sector in this sensitive field is, in the first 
place, unlikely to be made carelessly, without regard for 
their background and family connections – the notorious 
Chinese guanxi or informal networks of relationships.) 
Their “perceived disassociation” from Govt. is what 
gives credibility to this “non-official” media, which is in 
reality not non-official but the same official face of the 
State, essentially, wearing a different hat.  
8. People, especially intellectuals, use the official press 
for tracking nuances of Govt. policy and the commercial 
media and I-net for obtaining credible ‘real’ news. 
9. The main features of the situation on the censorship 
front are: 
a) Commercialization of the media has “opened a 
gap in the Chinese Govt.’s control of the news 
media” (according to journalist and human rights 




China”, published in 2004 by the international 
NGO, Human Rights in China). 
Competition for audiences provides a strong 
motivation for the press (and news sites) to 
publish/post a news story before the authorities 
impose a ban on it. Thus there has been an 
exponential expansion in the amount of 
information available to the public and, 
concomitantly, an unprecedented enhancement of 
space, and possibilities, for protest, as witnessed 
in the early phase of the pro-Google Net 
commentaries last year before the ‘50 cent Army’ 
– so known for posting ‘paid comments’ at the 
behest of the State for a small payment -- was 
invoked in no time in order to overwhelm the 
initially spontaneous outburst of comments 
favorable to Google with contrived contrary ones 
masquerading as genuine (counter) trends in 
public opinion.  
b)  Magazines are not controlled as strictly as 
newspapers, perhaps because of their limited 
impact (lower frequency of publication and 
smaller readership); so also the economic and 
commercial press. 
c)   While censorship of the press and TV is subtle 
(and largely invisible), that over the I-net is done 
without making any bones about it – it cannot be 
otherwise, for it becomes obvious anyway. Two 




chacha, after the Chinese language characters for 
‘police’–jing cha) appear on the computer 
screens of users on specified websites to remind 
them of their being monitored, on the ostensible 
plea of publicizing the message that the I-net is 
not to be regarded as a space beyond the purview 
of the law.  
d)   Change of form, and style, but not in essence: on 
umpteen occasions, the Chinese authorities have 
shown that they will do whatever it takes to make 
sure that information reaching the public by any 
means (including through the commercial media 
and I-net) does not have the potential of rousing 
the latter to challenge CCP rule. 
10. The most notable aspect of the (essentially 
unchanged) story of censorship and control of the media in 
China is the emergence of a chink in the censor's armour, 
and the fact that the political game is changing as a result 
(as described in the following sections), all attempts by the 
authorities to retain control over the new media, as with 
the conventional media hitherto, notwithstanding. 
III. Impact of the New Information Environment  
11. In terms of chronology, commercialization of the 
media picked up momentum only in the 90s, after 
recovering from the regression that followed the June 
1989 Tiananmen events (the brutal, and highly 




members of the public seeking political reform, which 
left the entire system in a state of shock, as it were).  
12. The 2003 SARS crisis has been termed as a turning 
point in the relations between the State, media and the 
citizenry, exposing as it did the soft underbelly of the 
clamped up and instinctively restrictive Chinese Party 
State. China was seen, internationally in the court of 
(world) public opinion, to be directly responsible for 
creating a global pandemic, all out of nothing as it were, 
because of its scant regard for transparency and full 
disclosure norms and desiderata even in a non-sensitive, 
indeed non-political, area like health and that too in the 
wake of an obviously looming humanitarian crisis. The 
dismissal of the Health Minister it resulted in could not 
but have shaken media policy too. (To the core, in fact, in 
all likelihood -- in internal debates within the CCP, irres-
pective of the dour front presented to the world outside). 
13.  2008 was an important landmark, with the passage 
of an RTI like provision and a high profile visit to the 
People's Daily office by President Hu Jintao on its 60
th
 
anniversary, soon after a successful, CCP directed, 
experiment with information transparency during the 
Szchuan earthquake a month earlier. He utilised the 
occasion to articulate a new approach towards the media, 
chatting with netizens and stressing the need for the 
(official) media  to take the initiative  to shape and  
“channel public opinion,” (yindao yulun). The first 
“mass incident” (official Chinese term for public protest 
demonstrations and social unrest events) was reported 




various levels soon began to use online official state 
media like People’s Daily Online and Xinhua Online to 
report sudden-breaking incidents at the earliest – 
something that would have been considered unthinkable 
previously, for fear of inviting social and political 
instability.  
   [The numbers of such incidents are now 
acknowledged, officially, to be rising drastically in 
recent years – to as many as 180,000 in 2010, according 
to a reliable estimate. The rush for reporting them has 
resulted in yindao yulun being described, (resentfully) in 
popular parlance, as “grabbing the megaphone”, showing 
that there is contention over the opportunity for setting 
the agenda.] 
14.  The overall impact of the new information 
environment can be discerned in several dimensions:  
 
 Greater independence for the press and media in 
general -- gradually, as a result of Chinese 
journalists’ increasing interaction with their 
counterparts abroad (which has led to journalists 
re-examining their self-perception of their 
professional role). 
  
 Political – domestic: comment is relatively freer 
(than before), other than on taboo topics that are 
widely recognized, and tacitly accepted, as 
sensitive subjects. Examples of the latter would 




over power, competitive multi-party system, 
separation of powers (within the party – in 
obvious, albeit pale, imitation of the 
Montesquiean precept of mutual independence 
between the judiciary, legislature and executive), 
pros and cons of subordination of the military to 
the State (rather than the Party), Tiananmen '89, 
Tibet, Taiwan, fundamental issues such as the 
relationship between political power and business 
interest, power and corruption and so on. 
 
 Political – foreign policy/affairs related.       
There are two main trends here: 
a)  shedding of reserve, both in content and in 
form (in expression and style): The 
emergence of a ‘non-official’ media is 
utilized (by the establishment, albeit without 
publicity and with plausible deniability in 
reserve) to come out with comments in 
unrestrained language in a manner 
unthinkable in the past. In other words, the 
‘non-official’ media has served to redress the 
asymmetry, from the Chinese point of view, 
they suffered from vis-à-vis States with a free 
press, where rabid and hard line opinion (on 
all issues but on relations with China in 
particular) could find public expression 
without possibility of reciprocal compliments 
from the Chinese side (so long as all their 




official). Now this so-called unofficial media 
segment is utlised to convey blunt messages 
to other countries, under cover of its 
representing ‘a section of opinion’, when it is 
an open secret that opinion expressed therein 
takes its cue from official quarters, 
invariably. Thus both Global Times, and its 
TV equiva-lent, the Hong Kong based 
Phoenix TV, have extensive ties with the 
CCP through the top echelons of the People’s 
Daily and CCP CC.    
b) heightened blowbacks (from the usually 
volatile on-line public opinion) into the   
foreign policy process: These come via a 
multiplicity of channels (some direct and 
others indirect, through the impact of on-line 
chatter on new constituencies such as the 
PLA, businessmen, youth, conventional 
media etc.), resulting in foreign policy 
decisions being influenced and buffeted by a 
variety of actors now, as compared to the past 
when the (putative) 'central mind' of the Party 
State was the sole determinant. 
[Contrary to the commonly held view that 
the Government itself resorts to fanning hard 
line nationalist sentiment with the aim of 
diverting attention away from its domestic 
(governance) shortcomings and abating 
questioning of its legitimacy to rule, it has 




boomerang effect, possibly because of 
realisation that this process can easily go out 
of control and may, in fact, leave the 
Government worse off (i.e. without any good 
options for dealing with situations and 
possibly even be counter-productive). This 
applies, above all, to relations with Japan, 
where historical memories provide fertile 
ground for fueling of nationalist passions, but 
also to relations with USA (over the Taiwan 
issue and otherwise as well). The Government 
would not like to (and perhaps cannot afford 
to) be seen to be weak in its dealings with 
these countries above all, for fear of historical 
parallels being drawn to its disadvantage.]  
 Passage of RTI like provision in 2008: the 
“Regulations on Open Government Information” 
require officials to release information during 
disasters and emergencies and permit citizens to 
seek various kinds of information (even without 
an emergency, as happened in case of a request 
for Shanghai budget allocation figures that was 
initially turned down, on the plea of being a State 
secret, but later complied with following a wave 
of censure in the press, including in the State 
news agency Xinhua). 
 Growing vigilante watchdog role, with some 
journalists and netizens engaging in advocacy 




      [Citizen journalism – Chinese style: The term 
“human flesh search engine” has come into 
vogue, to describe the newly emergent pheno-
menon of individuals (or even officials as well, at 
times) believed to be involved in immoral or 
illegal activities being caught in camera (on the 
cell phone or video) and then exposed on the Net, 
with these stories (often fed into the press and 
TV) frequently generating pressure on the 
authorities to take cognizance and act. 
Thus, e.g., a Shaanxi official, Yang Dacai, was 
sacked earlier this year after an I-net campaign 
exposed his several expensive watches well 
beyond affordability with his legal income. (The 
individual who initiated the campaign has earned 
the nick-name 'watch watchdog' for his ambition 
to focus on expensive watches as a means of 
promoting the goal of full disclosure of wealth of 
officials.) Likewise the blind human rights 
activist, Chen Guachang’s exposure of forced 
sterilizations led to huge public protests of 
human rights violations. There are several other 
cases of remedial action taken in response to joint 
action by affected groups (such as local residents 
opposed to location of potentially pollutant 
factories in their neighbourhoods, parents of 
school children who died due to collapse of a 
shoddily constructed school building or tainted 
milk powder and so on). They came to light after 
their success; there are likely to be many more, 




well known, to the public at large even within 
China, not to mention the world outside.]  
 Rise of 'people power' of another kind – of 
organizing for self-help, rather than depending on 
Government. This is a new phenomenon: people 
coming forth with public (on-line) offers of help 
(support through personal involvement of one 
kind or another, going beyond monetary 
assistance) to those in adversity during calamities 
(Szchuan earthquake, Beijing flood and the like). 
 
 Media influencing adjudication outcomes in the 
courts, both directly (via inflamed public opinion 
against official culpability for wrong doing) and 
indirectly (through the impact of media exposés 
on Party officials, which lead them, at times, to 
feel obliged or encouraged to intervene in the 
courts -- for opportunistic or populist reasons). 
15. The propaganda wings of the CCP and the State, 
always adept at thinking on their feet, have been bracing 
themselves up to match, and master, the challenge of 
growing 'people power' facilitated by the I-net. Acutely 
aware of the importance of the microblogosphere as the 
new battleground for winning over public opinion in a 
hyper-connected world, the CCP leadership has tried to 
revive its time honoured messianic message and 
combine it with emphasis on the need for mastery of the 
new medium: exhorting local Party secretaries and other 
officials to “understand and comply with the will of the 




them to become 'new media' savvy. This manner of 
practice has been dubbed as “Control 2.0″ to describe the 
more sophisticated directions in which information and 
news management has been evolving in recent years. 
16. Overall, there is little doubt that the I-net has 
considerably eroded the tight control that the CCP 
traditionally exercised over political communication, 
transcending as it does the one way, top down, time-
consuming communication of the conventional media. 
IV. Official Approach in the Changing Scenario:  
17. Officialdom is “deeply ambivalent” about the new 
information environment fostered by the social media 
and I-net and commercialisation of the press and TV. In 
the words of some broad minded Chinese journalists 
cited in Western scholarship: 
 It recognizes its potential benefits (and 
inevitability, may be) – improved governance 
and strengthened popular support accruing from 
checks on errant local/provincial governments 
and/or officials, greater efficiency (in the process 
of economic development) through better 
informed markets and so on.  
 
 But it is also acutely conscious of the severe risks 
it is subjected to in consequence – opening of 
political space for crystallization of opposition 
and new demands being made on the 




meet, as e.g. generation of pressures for 
revelation of the activities and cogitations of the 
top leadership, full disclosure of the life-style of 
the Party’s nomenklatura etc.  
By opting to give up some degree of control, they make 
a trade-off -- hoping to reap the former (advantages), 
while feverishly seeking to avert the latter (risks). 
18. A distinction needs to be made here on two related 
dimensions: 
a) Level, i.e. national or provincial and lower, and 
b) nature of issues, i.e. governance and livelihood 
issues, on the one hand, and political issues, on 
the other. 
There is a divergence between the approach (and 
interests) of the central and local leaderships. So long as 
the grievance or issue over which information or 
involvement is sought by the public are not political in 
nature but pertain to livelihood or governance related 
matters, the central leadership may not be averse 
encouraging the media, it may be surmised, to play a 
watchdog role to help it exercise oversight over 
provincial and local authorities. So it may actually find it 
expedient to encourage the system to relinquish control 
(over the media) and embrace greater transparency and 
openness. It is only when systemic issues – of a political 
nature – are at stake that it is likely to be conservative 




that was likely to provoke sharp differences of opinion at 
the topmost levels of the (central) leadership – i.e. in the 
Politburo and/or its Standing Committee.  
19. The nightmare scenario for the central leadership 
would, it may be surmised, be a combination of a new 
media fed/bred opposition movement at the ground level 
and an elite split at the top, as that would seal the fate of 
the rulers in the absence of military backing – something 
that may not be forthcoming in such a charged socio-
political situation.  
[Tiananmen June 4, 1989 is the defining moment 
in this regard as it almost brought down CCP rule. But 
for Deng Xiaoping’s enormous political weight, which 
enabled the (divided) Politburo to take a decision to 
invoke the military against the protesters (and evoke 
compliance from the PLA for the same – two Generals 
were rumoured to have declined to send troops to 
suppress the protesting students), all might have been 
lost (from their standpoint).  
And that was before the age of the instantaneous 
mass media; before the color revolutions in Eastern 
Europe, Iran 2009, the Arab Spring revolutions of last 
year and, above all, the Anna Hazare movement in India 
-- each of which would have given the CCP jitters, we 
can be sure.] 
20. The destabilizing potential of the new 
communication technologies, and the freer environment 




today, would undoubtedly be a question to which the 
CCP would be paying extremely close attention. 
(Allusions to the need for proper  “management of the I-
net” have, notably, been made in every Report of the 
head (General Secretary) of the Party at each Party 
Congress post-'92.) 
21. Their watchwords might be guessed to be something 
on the following lines: 
a) prevent large scale social unrest from   
crystallizing at any one point (or a credibility 
gap on any issue, be it a localized one, from 
becoming a rallying point nationally); 
b)   avoid public splits in the top leadership ranks; 
c)   ensure loyalty of the PLA at all costs. 
Spread of the I-net and new social media and commercial-
ization of the conventional media have consequences for 
all three aspects, albeit most of all in respect of the first.  
22. Hence the frightful, almost apocalyptic, 2010 
reaction to Google, which appears to have been viewed 
officially to have had the makings of a ‘digital 
Tiananmen 1989’. 
23. Hence also the continuing attempts all along to 
impose various restrictions on I-net users – the end 2011 
requirement that service providers ensure that users use 




V. Overall Assessment 
24. China’s media policies have been characterised as an 
“inconsistent amalgam of improved transparency and 
responsiveness, on the one hand, and huge investments 
in more effective censorship, on the other”. It is not 
surprising therefore that the human rights activist He 
Qinglian has assessed that Chinese journalists may be 
“dancing in shackles” but they are dancing all the same! 
Caught between the liberating influence of 
commercialization and instantaneous digital 
communication technology, on the one hand, and the 
choking impact of controls, on the other – the tussle 
between the (official) push for feng (“block” or 
censorship) and the (normative) pull of shai 
(“conducting activities under sunshine” or transparent 
disclosure) -- they (and the netizens) have become adept 
at playing a cat and mouse game with the censors, 
increasingly to the disadvantage of the latter in the I-net 
age.  
25. This change, significant as it is in a longitudinal 
perspective, is confined – so far – to nuts and bolt issues 
relating to governance and livelihood matters that affect 
people directly and where judgements about right and 
wrong are straightforward and clear cut. It does not 
extend to abstract (political) questions with a bearing on 
systemic shortcomings and administrative reform, in 
conformity with the official line permitting – even 
welcoming – “constructive criticism” but not freedom of 
speech that is potentially disruptive of “social harmony” 




[Hence the popular satirical description of 
silencing of outspoken individuals as “having been 
harmonised”  (bei hexie). And, likewise, skeptical popular 
perception of the euphemism “stability preservation” that 
is liberally prefixed or suffixed in official lexicon to 
nomenclature of all kinds of activities -- as e.g. projects, 
programs, organizations, seminar themes, budget Heads 
(and even bonuses payable to cadres in one province, 
where part of bonus payments due were withheld for being 
released later, subject to no “stability disruption” 
activity/acts attributable to the cadre's non-performance, or 
lack of vigilance, being found subsequently upon review).]  
26. Explosive growth of on-line public opinion, and 
pressures stemming from commercialization, are, 
nevertheless, altering the strategic interaction between 
the leadership and the public all round, as the former 
struggles to head off social unrest and maintain citizen 
allegiance and acceptance of legitimacy of its authority.  
27. The jury is out on the question of the stability, and 
future, of the Chinese polity under the impact of a media 
changing as above. Will it run along the lines scripted by 
CCP apparatchiks, seeking to “sustain their collective 
belief in a paradigm of control” by putting the new 
features of the modern (digital) media to ‘good’ use but 
trying to contain the risks they pose for preserving their 
authoritarian, nay totalitarian, regime ?  No one can say.            
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